

“Wulderstorff’s Quodlibet”

by Stephen Read

Paul Vincent Spade contrasts the calm and measured reaction of medieval thinkers to the “insolubles” (logical paradoxes such as the Liar) with the troubled response of philosophers and mathematical logicians more recently to the semantic antinomies in modern logic and set theory.¹ The latter is often described as a crisis in the foundations of mathematics.² But there was a comparable crisis in medieval philosophy and theology, namely over the apparent incompatibility of the newly rediscovered Aristotelian logic and Christian theology, specifically in the latter’s doctrine of the Trinity.³ According to that doctrine, codified at the fourth Lateran Council in 1215, God is undivided in his essence but distinct according to the properties of the three persons. This appears to open the faithful to heresy through the following expository syllogism:

Haec essentia est filius

Haec essentia est pater

Ergo pater est filius,⁴

contradicting the distinctness of the Son and the Father. The paralogism can also be formulated as a first-figure syllogism in Darii as follows:

Omnis deus est pater

Filius in divinis est deus

Igitur Filius in divinis est pater.⁵

¹ Paul Vincent Spade, ‘Recent research on medieval logic’, *Synthese* 40 (1979), 3–18, p.8. See also Paul Vincent Spade and Stephen Read, “Insolubles”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2021 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta: <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2021/entries/insolubles/>.

² See, e.g., Abraham Fraenkel, Yehoshua Bar-Hillel and Azriel Levy, *Foundations of Set Theory* (Amsterdam: North-Holland 1973), ch.1 §§1 and 5.

³ See, e.g., P. Boehner, ‘The medieval crisis of logic and the author of the *Centiloquium* attributed to Ockham’, *Franciscan Studies* 4 (1944), 151–70, reprinted in his *Collected Articles on Ockham*, ed. E.M. Buytaert (St Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute 1958), 351–72.

⁴ See, e.g., Alfonso Maierù, ‘Logica aristotelica e teologia trinitaria: Enrico Totting da Oyta’, in *Studi sul XIV secolo in memoria di Anneliese Maier*, ed. A. Maierù and A. Paravicini Bagliani (Roma: Storia e Letteratura 1981), 481-512, pp.508–9.

⁵ See, e.g., Johann Auer, ‘Die aristotelische Logik in der Trinitätslehre der Spätscholastik. Bemerkungen zu einer Quaestio des Johannes Wuel de Pruck, Wien 1422’, in *Theologie in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Michael Schmaus zum sechzigsten Geburtstag dargebracht von seinen Freunden und Schülern*, edd. Johann Auer & Hermann Volk (München: Zink 1957), 457–96, p.475: “nam secundum regulas Aristotelis hoc argumentum esset in Darii: Omnis Deus est pater, et Filius in Divinis est Deus, igitur Filius in Divinis

The premises are true, the argument is valid by Aristotle's lights, but the conclusion is heretical.

This is the background to Thomas Wölfel of Wulderstorff's *Quodlibetal* challenge. The syllogism was understood to be a theory of formal consequence, and that is certainly the way Aristotle took it in the *Prior Analytics*, where each syllogistic mood is presented schematically, holding for arbitrary substitutions of categorematic terms for the dummy letters that Aristotle employs. To be sure, there was a sharp difference of opinion between Oxford and Paris over the right account of formality, in Oxford applying whenever an understanding of the conclusion was contained in the premises, while those in Paris followed Buridan's lead in interpreting formal consequence as consequence preserved under arbitrary uniform substitution of categorematic terms.⁶ But if the above trinitarian arguments are invalid while having the form of certain syllogistic moods, then syllogistic moods are not closed under substitution and so are not formal by the Parisian account. And it is clear from the second part of Thomas's *Quodlibet* that he does take formality in the Parisian sense.

The trinitarian paralogisms appear to have been much discussed in Vienna following the arrival of Henry Langenstein of Hesse and Henry Totting of Oyta hotfoot from Paris at the second foundation of the University in the early 1380s. In 1957, Johann Auer published a composite edition collating three works discussing this conflict between logic and theology from Vienna in these years at the turn of the fifteenth century. The base treatise was part of Henry Totting's *Abbreviatio* of Adam Wodeham's *Sentences Commentary*;⁷ this section had been re-used and extended in numerous *Sentences* lectures at Vienna, and Auer edited the versions in what he and others thought were *Quaestiones Magistrales* of Nicholas Prunczlein of Dinkelsbühl from 1409–13 and a *Quaestio* of Johannes Wuel of Pruck from 1421, but which were likely by Andrew of Waytra (1423–25) and John Angrer of Müldorf (1421–23) respectively, both of whom figure in this

est Pater; et tamen secundum fidem nostram antecedens est verum et consequens haeticum.” Simo Knuuttila, in his discussion of the issue in ‘Trinitarian fallacies, identity and predication’, in *Trinitarian Theology in the Latin West*, ed. P. Kärkkäinen (Helsinki: Luther-Agricola-Society 2007), 69–87, p.69, cites similar paralogisms from Roger Roseth.

⁶ See, e.g., Stephen Read, ‘The medieval theory of consequence’, *Synthese* 187 (2012), 899–912, p.904.

⁷ For discussion of Henry's *Abbreviatio* and its importance to our understanding of Wodeham's thought, see W. Courtenay, *Adam Wodeham* (Leiden: Brill 1978), esp. Ch.1.

volume.⁸ The challenge to Thomas Wölfel, perhaps to test his knowledge of and skill with this tradition, was to reconcile Aristotelian logic with Christian theology. Otherwise, as the author of the *Quaestio* observes at the start of his treatise, “our faith will be exposed to the derision of infidels.”⁹

Aristotle seems to have based his theory of the syllogism on what became known as the principles *dici de omni* and *dici de nullo*, stated by Peter of Spain in his famous *Tractatus*:

“*Dici de omni* est quando nichil est sumere sub subiecto de quo non dicatur predicatus, ut ‘*omnis homo currit*’; hic cursus dicitur de omni homine et nichil est sumere sub homine de quo non dicatur cursus. *Dici de nullo* est quando nichil est sumere sub subiecto a quo non removeatur predicatus, ut ‘*nullus homo currit*’; hic cursus removetur a quolibet homine.”¹⁰

Aristotle recognises that there are other forms of argument besides the syllogism, *viz* enthymeme, induction and example,¹¹ but all syllogism is governed by the *dici de omni et*

⁸ See n.5. For the attribution of the *Quaestiones* to Waytra, see Edit Anna Lukács, ‘Sentences Commentaries from the Early University of Vienna under the Paleographical Magnifying Glass’, *Iter Austriacum*, 25 February 2016, URL: <http://www.iter-austriacum.at/uncategorized/sentences-commentaries-from-the-early-university-of-vienna-under-the-paleographical-magnifying-glass/>. This *Quaestio* had been attributed to Thomas of Wulderstorff by Joseph Ritter von Aschbach, *Geschichte der Wiener Universität im ersten Jahrhunderte ihres Bestehens* (Vienna: K.K.Universität 1865), pp.557–8, §50, esp. n.4); was attributed to Arnold of Seehausen by Michael Shank, *Unless You Believe, You Shall Not Understand: Logic, University, and Society in Late Medieval Vienna* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press 1988), p.119, who claimed that Pruck was merely the scribe; and is actually by John Anger of Mueldorf, as shown in William J. Courtenay, ‘From Dinkelsbühl’s Questiones Communes to the Vienna Group Commentary. The Vienna ‘School’, 1415-1425’, in *Nicholas of Dinkelsbühl and the Sentences at Vienna in the Early Fifteenth Century*, ed. Monica Brinzei (Turnhout: Brepols 2015), 268–315, p. 288; cf. Monica Brinzei and Chris Schabel, ‘The Past, Present, and Future of Late Medieval Theology: The Commentary on the Sentences by Nicholas of Dinkelsbühl, Vienna, ca. 1400’, in *Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, vol.3, ed. Philipp Rosemann (Leiden: Brill 2015), 174–266, pp.178–9, 206–7, 210–1.

⁹ Auer, ‘Die aristotelische Logik in der Trinitätslehre’, p.475: “Pro intellectu autem dictorum et consequenter dicendorum quaeritur utrum regulae philosophorum et Aristotelis de syllogismis sufficient generaliter catholicis ad syllogicandum in divinis. Et arguitur quod sic; nam dicere quod tales non sufficient est exponere fidem nostram derisioni infidelium.”

¹⁰ Petrus Hispanus, *Tractatus* IV 1, ed. L.M. De Rijk (van Gorcum 1972), p.43; cf. Peter of Spain, *Summaries of Logic*, ed. & tr. B. Copenhagen et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2014), p.170.

¹¹ See, e.g., Petrus Hispanus, *Tractatus*, tract 5 §3, p.56: “Argumentationis quatuor sunt species: sillogismus, induction, entimema, exemplum;” cf. Peter of Spain, *Summaries of Logic*, p.198. Cf. Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, tr. J.H. Freese (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 2014), 1365a-b: “But for purposes of demonstration, real or apparent, just as Dialectic possesses two modes of argument, induction and the syllogism, real or apparent, the same is the case in Rhetoric; for the example is induction, and the

nullo, as Thomas Wölfel notes in §§22–23, referring to Peter by name. Each syllogism consists of two premises each of subject-predicate (aka “categorical”) form, from which a further proposition of the same form, the conclusion, may be validly deduced. Thus every syllogism is by definition valid, and contains three terms each occurring twice, two of them occurring once in a premise and once in the conclusion, the third (the middle term) occurring once in each premise. Aristotle divides the premise-pair of each syllogism into three figures, and Thomas follows him in this (§4): the first where the middle term is subject in one premise and predicate in the other; the second where the middle term is the predicate of each premise; and the third where the middle term is subject of each premise. In the first figure, the major term is the one which is predicated of the middle, and the minor that of which the middle term is predicated. The conclusion is said to be “direct” if the minor term is subject in the conclusion (and the major term the predicate), “indirect” if the minor term is the predicate. Later authors distinguished the case of indirect conclusions in the first figure as a fourth figure, so that the conclusion is direct in each figure.¹² Aristotle demonstrated the validity of the second- and third-figure moods, and the indirect moods in the first figure, by reducing them to the direct moods of the first figure (called “perfect”) by various conversions and other moves. There are four such perfect moods, the first four listed in the famous mnemonic found in Peter of Spain’s *Tractatus* and other pedagogic texts:

“Barbara Celarent Darii Ferio Baralipon

enthymeme a syllogism, and the apparent enthymeme an apparent syllogism. Accordingly I call an enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism, and an example rhetorical induction.”

¹² All conclusions are direct in the second and third figures, for an indirect conclusion would be no more than the result of interchanging the order of the premises. The medievals believed, apparently falsely, that the fourth figure was recognised by Galen. See, e.g., John Spangler Kieffer, *Galen’s ‘Institutio Logica’* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 2020), p.102. However, Galen’s logical writings were known only indirectly in the medieval West. Joannes Dorp expands on Buridan’s comments in his *Summulae de Dialectica* in his *Perutile compendium totius logice Joannis Buridani cum preclarissima solertissimi viri Joannis Dorp expositione* (Venetiis: Petrus de Quarengiis, Bergomensis 1499), sig.M1ra: “Dubitatur secundo ex quo ponenda est quarta figura utrum sit distincta quam primam. Pro solutione huius dubitationis notandum est quod prima figura potest capi dupliciter. Uno modo large prout est cuius medium subiicitur in una premissarum et predicatur in alia, sive hoc sit in maiore sive in minore [...] Alio modo capitur prima figura stricte prout est cuius medium subiicitur in maiore et predicatur in minore [...] Ex quo patet quomodo potest salvari dictum galieni ponentis quartam figuram esse distinctam quam primam unde ipse cepit primam figuram stricte. Secundo sequitur quod aliqui male indignati sunt galieno principii medicorum qui dixerunt quod galienus ponendo quartam figuram misit falsam in messem alienam.” There was a further edition published at Lyon under the title *Summulae Buridani, cum expositione preclari viri interpretis: nominalium terminorum Iohannis Dorp, recognite a magistro nostro Iohane Maiore* (Lugduni: Stephano Gueygnardi 1512).

Celantes Dabitur Fapesmo Frisesomorum
Cesare Cambestres Festino Baroco Darapti
Felapton Disamis Datisi Bocardo Ferison.”¹³

The first three vowels of each mood indicate the quantity and quality of the premises and conclusion: ‘a’ universal affirmative; ‘e’ universal negative; ‘i’ particular affirmative; ‘o’ particular negative.¹⁴ The names of the derivative moods contain a key to their reduction to the perfect moods. Take Fapesmo, for example: ‘F’ indicates that Fapesmo is reduced to Ferio; ‘p’ that the first premise should be converted partially (aka *per accidens*); ‘s’ that the second premise should be converted simply; and ‘m’ that the premises be interchanged. Thus the premises of Fapesmo, of the form ‘Omnis M est P’ and ‘Nullus S est M’, are converted and interchanged to yield ‘Nullus M est S’ and ‘Aliquis P est M’, which themselves as premises of Ferio yield ‘Aliquis P non est S’, the indirect conclusion of Fapesmo. In his second conclusion (§25) Thomas points out that a third-figure syllogism might obey the rules of *dici de omni et nullo* but not in fact be reducible to a perfect syllogism. He gives an example from Baroco, where ‘c’ indicates that the mood should be demonstrated by reduction *per impossibile*, by taking the major premise with the contradictory of the conclusion and inferring the contradictory of the minor by a perfect mood. But in his example, correctly inferring ‘Every man is not a man’ from the premises ‘Every man is an animal’ and ‘A man is not an animal’, the resulting first-figure inference is not strictly a syllogism, since the conclusion is identical with the major premise. For Aristotle requires that in a syllogism “something other than what was laid down results”:

“Syllogismus autem est oratio in qua positis quibusdam aliud quid ab his
quae posita sunt ex necessitate accidit eo quod haec sint.”¹⁵

Consequently, if Thomas is right in claiming that every syllogism is valid in virtue of its form, every instance of each syllogistic mood is a valid inference but not necessarily a syllogism.

¹³ Petrus Hispanus, *Tractatus*, p.52; cf. Peter of Spain, *Summaries of Logic*, p.190.

¹⁴ Note that the Latin ‘particularis’ for the quality of propositions such as ‘aliquis homo currit’ is standardly rendered ‘particular’ in English, though its real meaning is ‘partial’.

¹⁵ *Analytica Priora*: Boethius trans., recensio Florentina, *Aristoteles Latinus*: III.1-4, ed. L. Minio-Paluello (Bruges/Paris: Desclée de Brouwer 1962), 6.

As the mnemonic shows, Peter of Spain and most other medievals recognised nine moods in the first figure. However, Thomas Wölfel states at the start of his *Quodlibet* (§4):

“The first figure has 19 moods taking ‘mood’ for the premises and conclusion together and not distinguishing the fourth figure from the first. This is especially clear because in the first figure there are 19 different ways of ordering the premises and conclusions with specific quality, quantity and position of the terms, therefore there are 19 different moods. The inference holds because from the different ways of ordering the premises and conclusions with specific quality, quantity and position of the terms the different moods are demonstrated.”

He then gives a four-line mnemonic, the first two lines of which are as above, but which continues in the third and fourth lines as follows:

Barbara, Celaront, Barbari, Didari, Fieronque

Calerent, Caleron, Celantes, Calentes, Calenton.

Apart from ‘Barbari’ and the repetition of ‘Barbara’ and ‘Celantes’, these mood names are unknown elsewhere, though further names do occur in other authors, especially those who distinguish a fourth figure. So what are these ten additional moods in the first figure? A clue may be found in Peter of Mantua’s *Logica*, who enumerates 18 moods in the first figure, despite also including a fourth figure.¹⁶ As in Peter of Spain’s mnemonic, Peter lists the four direct moods from *Prior Analytics* I 4 and the five indirect moods from I 7, together with what he calls Barbari and Celantos, which result from Barbara and Celantes by weakening the conclusion, and an indirect form of Ferio which he dubs Ferios. In addition, Peter gives variants of Barbari, Darii and Ferio, two further moods which he calls Celaront (misprinted as ‘Celarent’ in both editions) and Fapesmos, and an unnamed mood in IEO, where in all six the conclusion is “de inconsueto modo loquendi”—in a

¹⁶ Peter of Mantua, *Logica* (Padua: Johannes Herbort 1477), sig. J8rb–va; *ibid.* (Venetiis: Impressum per Bonetum Locatelli ad Instantia Nobilis Viri Octauiani Scoti Modoetiensis, 1492), sig. F5vb–F6rb. He actually enumerates fifteen moods, but three of them (namely, the second, fifth and sixth) each embrace two different permissible conclusions.

non-normal way of speaking, as I have translated it elsewhere.¹⁷ Such non-normal propositions were discussed by Buridan in his *Treatise on Consequences*,¹⁸ and allow O-propositions to be converted simply and E-propositions to be converted *per accidens*. Buridan writes:

“I call it ‘normal form’ where an external negation precedes the predicate, e.g., ‘No B is A’, ‘Some B is not A’. But I call the form ‘non-normal’ where the predicate precedes the negation and so is not distributed by it, e.g., ‘Every B A is not’, ‘Some B A is not’.”¹⁹

For example, propositions of the form ‘Quoddam S non est P’ convert to ‘Quoddam P S non est’, e.g., ‘Quoddam animal non est asinus’ converts to ‘Quoddam asinus animal non est’, that is, given the regimented Latin which Buridan employs, ‘Some ass (some) animal is not’, where in ‘Quoddam S non est P’, ‘P’ is distributed and ‘S’ is not, while in ‘Quoddam P S non est’, neither term is distributed. Consequently, they permit further conclusions to be inferred and further moods to be recognised. Juan Luis Vives spells it out:

“If every virtue is good and some justice is not a virtue, nothing results—the conjunction is as they say useless. Indeed, it proceeds from an undistributed term to a distributed one Every man is an animal, some sensible substance is not an animal, unless one infers a conclusion in this way: ‘therefore some sensible substance some animal is not’, so that ‘animal’ is undistributed. But no one speaks in this way. For that reason, Peter of Mantua and other sophists call them ‘in a non-normal way of speaking’.”²⁰

¹⁷ See S. Read, ‘Non-normal propositions in Buridan's logic’, in *Formal Approaches and Natural Language in Medieval Logic*, ed. L. Cesalli, F. Goubier and A. De Libera (Barcelona–Roma: Fédération Internationale des Instituts d'Études Médiévales 2016), 453–68.

¹⁸ See John Buridan, *Treatise on Consequences*, tr. S. Read (New York: Fordham University Press 2014), ‘Introduction’ §4.4, pp.23–25; I 8 Conclusion 14, p.85). Cf. Johannes Buridanus, *Tractatus de Consequentibus*, ed. H. Hubien (Louvain: Publications Universitaires 1976), pp.44–45.

¹⁹ Buridan, *Treatise on Consequences*, p.85; cf. Buridanus, *Tractatus de Consequentibus*, p.44: “Illum autem modum ‘consuetum’ uoco in quo negatio negans praecedat praedicatum, ut: Nullum B est A, Quoddam B non est A. Sed modum ‘inconsuetum’ uoco ubi praedicatum praecederet negationem et ita non distribueretur per ipsam, ut: Omne B A non est, Quoddam B A non est.”

²⁰ Joannes Ludovicus Vives, *De Disciplinis* (Coloniae: Ioannes Gymnicus 1533) III 3, p.559: “Quinta, si omnis virtus est bonum, & aliqua iustitia non est virtus, nihil efficitur: collatio est ut vocant inutilis: quippe proceditur a non distributo ad distributum: bonum fit maius virtute, & iustitia aequalis, aut minor

This allows Buridan and Peter of Mantua to increase the number of valid moods in the first figure to 18, though the set of moods they each recognise is different.²¹ For example, Peter writes:

“and fifteenthly, inferring a direct conclusion in the non-normal way of speaking, e.g., ‘Some animal is a substance, no accident is an animal, therefore some accident a substance is not.’”²²

All the moods in the final line of Thomas Wölfel’s “verses” (istis metris), which he labels Calerent, Caleron, Celantes, Calentes, and Calenton, can be explained as inferring a non-normal E- or O-conclusion (as can Fieron, though that could also be normal and indirect). The final line, consisting of non-normal moods, would then parallel the second line, in which all the moods are indirect (and Fieron, as non-normal, would then match Baralipton, as indirect). Nonetheless, the inclusion of such propositions of non-normal form does not explain every entry in those verses; the repetition of ‘Barbara’ is particularly obscure, since AAA holds only for a direct normal mood, as is Didari, in which the middle term would seem to be undistributed however it is construed.²³ Thomas claims the result is 19, but he does not fully explain how he arrives at this number, nor does he specify what the additional moods are.

bono: omnis homo est animal, aliqua substantia sensibilis non est animal, nisi quis sic colligat, ergo aliqua substantia sensibilis aliquod animal non est: ut animal non distribuatur. Sed nemo sic loquitur. Ideo Petrus Mantuanus, & alii sophistae has vocant de inconsueto modo loquendi.” That any term distributed in the conclusion must be distributed in the premises is one of the necessary conditions for syllogistic validity which Thomas lists in §29. They are found, possibly for the first time, in Buridan, *Treatise on Consequences* III ch.4 Conclusion 8, p.122. Cf. Buridanus, *Tractatus de Consequentibus*, p.91.

²¹ For those recognised by Buridan, see ‘Non-normal propositions in Buridan’s logic’, §3 Figure I, p.466. Puzzlingly, Peter seems to include affirmative syllogisms of non-normal form: “Prima constituitur ex tribus propositionibus affirmativis, ut ‘omne animal rationale est risibile, omnis homo est animal rationale, igitur omnis homo est risibilis’, que formula solet designari per dictionem istam ‘Barbara’. Secunda formula habet premissas modo dicto ordinatas concludens particularem affirmativam consequentis vel indefinitam prime formule quam posuimus et hanc Barbari solemus nominare. Potest etiam utraque formula premissarum conclusionem concludere de inconsueto modo loquendi [...] Quinta vero formula per hanc dictionem Darii designatur concludens conclusionem de consueto et inconsueto modo loquendi.” Unfortunately, he does not provide an example in these cases, as he does in others, such as the fifteenth, cited above, nor does he appear to define what he understands here by ‘de inconsueto modo loquendi’.

²² Peter of Mantua, *Logica* (1477, sig. J8vb; 1492, sig. F6ra). “[...] sequitur quintadecima concludens directe conclusionem de inconsueto modo loquendi, ut quoddam animal est substantia, nullum accidens est animal, igitur quoddam accidens substantia non est.”

²³ That the middle term be distributed is the other of the necessary conditions for syllogistic validity which Thomas lists in §29. See n.20 above.

Aristotle has several ways of establishing the validity and invalidity of each mood, in particular by deriving a further mood from one of the perfect moods, as explained above; or by giving a counterexample in the form of a trio of categorematic terms to substitute for the dummy letters in a mood to show it to be invalid.²⁴ This is further confirmation that Aristotle’s conception of syllogistic validity is formal. In the second section of his *Quodlibet*, Thomas Wölfel gives a detailed account of what he understands by ‘form’ in formal consequence. Two propositions have the same form only if the constituent categorematic terms have the same mode of supposition for something and occur the same number of times in the same order, and the propositions themselves have the same quality as a result of containing the same syncategorematic expressions. Thomas speaks of the corresponding terms in the two propositions being taken the same way (“requiruntur ad ydentitatem forme [...] eadem acceptio”): he clearly means the same mode of supposition since that is often defined by medieval logicians as “the taking of a categorematic term for something,” as in Peter of Spain’s definition:

“Suppositio vero est acceptio termini substantivi pro aliquo.”²⁵

Thomas spells this out in §35:

“By ‘the same way of being taken’ I understand that if <in one proposition> some term stands confusedly <and> distributively or determinately and so on, then in another which should be of the same form as it, the same term, or another, should stand confusedly <and> distributively, and so on.”

Moreover, if one of the terms “appellates its concept” (appellat suam rationem), so should the other. This is a term of art for a notion we find in particular in Buridan’s writings to explain puzzles of intensionality such as the Hidden Man.²⁶

²⁴ See, e.g., *Prior Analytics* I 4, 26a3–12, where he shows that there is no direct syllogistic conclusion in the first figure from a universal affirmative major and a universal negative minor. He continues through chs. 4–6 to apply this method to all the invalid moods throughout the three figures.

²⁵ Petrus Hispanus, *Tractatus*, p.80; cf. Peter of Spain, *Summaries of Logic*, Tract. VI, pp.240-1. On the medieval theory of supposition, see, e.g., Stephen Read, “Medieval Theories: Properties of Terms”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2023 Edition), eds. Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman, §3: <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/medieval-terms/#SuppCopu>.

²⁶ See John Buridan, *Summule de Suppositionibus*, ed. R. van der Lecq (Nijmegen: Ingenium 1998), §4.5.3 (pp.83–87); *Summulae de Dialectica*, tr. G. Klima (New Haven: Yale University Press 2001), pp.294–7. Cf. Gyula Klima, *John Buridan* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009), ch.8 §6 (pp.191–202) and Read, “Medieval Theories: Properties of Terms”, §5: <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/medieval-terms/#Appc>.

What Thomas has to say about syncategorematic expressions is interesting and takes us right to the heart of Thomas's solution to the trinitarian paralogsms: first, Thomas includes demonstrative pronouns among the syncategoremata as well as more obvious expressions like 'every'; secondly, two occurrences of a demonstrative pronoun, as well as two occurrences of a quantifier like 'every', can differ in kind. A demonstrative pronoun is a syncategorematic expression because it has no meaning of its own but only when coupled to a categorematic term. If I point to something and say 'this', somehow a kind of thing must be presupposed or specified for it to be clear what I am referring to. Now take two occurrences of 'ille' qualifying 'homo' (§42), one referring to John, the other to Peter. Since different men are referred to, then we do not have identity of kind (*ydentitas specifica*) of the syncategorematic expressions. The same point applies to a distributive expression like 'every' (§44). In some way, the range of the distribution must be presupposed or specified.

This is the nub of the solution to the trinitarian paralogsms which Thomas has taken from John of Mueldorf's *Quaestio*. Take the first paralogism:

Haec essentia est filius
 Haec essentia est pater
 Ergo pater est filius.

It is an expository syllogism, a syllogistic form adapted by medieval logicians from a further method of demonstrating the validity of certain third-figure syllogisms suggested by Aristotle. Speaking of the mood later called Darapti (Every M is P, every M is S, so some S is P), Aristotle writes:

“The demonstration can also be carried out [...] by setting out (ecthesis).
 For if both terms belong to all S, and one chooses one of the Ss, say N, then
 both P and R will belong to it, so that P will belong to some R.”²⁷

It's crucial here that it is the same S that is said to be both P and R. The principle behind this mode of reasoning is stated by Aristotle in several places, in particular in *De Sophisticis Elenchis*: he writes (in Boethius's translation):

²⁷ *Prior Analytics*, tr. G. Striker (Oxford: Clarendon Press 2009) I 6, 28a24-6. Cf. Boethius trans., recensio Florentina, *Aristoteles Latinus* III.1-4, 15–16: “Est autem et per impossibile et expositione facere demonstrationem; si enim ambo omni S insunt, si sumatur aliquid eorum quae sunt S, ut N, huic et P et R inerunt ex necessitate, quare alicui R inerit P.”

“Nam quae uni et eidem eadem, et sibi invicem probamus esse eadem.”²⁸

The idea for solving the paralogism, tracing back at least to Henry Totting, is that there is an equivocation in the reference of the term ‘haec essentia’, involving the demonstrative pronoun ‘haec’.

Of the many proposed solutions to the trinitarian fallacy, Buridan’s early response in his *Treatise on Consequences* is perhaps the least convincing. The first of his Conclusions is that “no syllogisms are formal in the common and customary way of speaking.”²⁹ But he continues:

“The reason for this Conclusion is that terms may be found for which the form is not valid, for the rules given earlier are not valid for them. For example, this is not valid: ‘This God is the Father and this same God is the Son, so the Father is the Son’ [...] Now whether according to another way of speaking syllogisms in divine terms are formally valid and what that form is, I leave to the theologians. And it should be noted and always kept in mind that, because it is not for me, an Arts man, to decide regarding the foregoing beyond what was said, I will for the rest call ‘formal’ those syllogisms to whose form one cannot give counterexamples other than in divine terms. I don’t understand by this that they are unconditionally formal, but only that they don’t contain terms relating to the distinctness of the divine persons.”

This is to give with one hand what was taken away by the other. We don’t want to know if there’s a special Buridanian sense of ‘formal’ in which syllogisms are formal. We

²⁸ *Aristoteles Latinus* VI 1-3, *De sophisticis elenchis. Translatio Boethii [...]*, ed. B.G. Dod (Leiden-Bruxelles: Desclée De Brouwer 1975), ch.6 (pp.16–17).

²⁹ Buridan, *Treatise on Consequences*, III 4 Conclusion 1, p.118. Cf. Buridanus, *Tractatus de Consequentibus*, p.86: “Nulli sunt syllogismi formales secundum communem et consuetum modum loquendi [...] Causa huius conclusionis est quia inveniuntur termini in quibus talis forma non ualet, propter hoc quod sic non ualebant in eis regulae prius dictae. Verbi gratia, non ualet sic: Iste deus est pater et iste idem deus est filius; ergo filius [...] Utrum autem secundum alium modum locutionis syllogismi de forma ualeant in terminis diuinis et quae sit illa forma relinquo theologis. Et est notandum et semper in memoria habendum quod, quia non pertinet ad me artistam de praedictis ultra praedicta determinare et quia etiam nomina sunt significatina ad placitum, ego de caetero uocabo syllogismos ‘formales’ contra quorum formam non erit dare aliam instantiam quam in terminis diuinis. Et non intelligam per hoc quod sint simpliciter formales, sed ex hypothesi solum quod non fiant in terminis pertinentibus ad discretionem personarum diuinarum.” Note that by ‘consuetum modum loquendi’ he is not referring to the normal way of construing negative propositions mentioned earlier, but to the customary notion of formal consequence.

wanted to know if they are formal in the customary sense—which he has admitted in his first Conclusion they are not.

But the key to a less equivocal and more positive solution is latent in Buridan's remarks. For he adds, immediately after stating his first Conclusion:

“I call ‘the common and customary way of speaking’ the way of speaking without the addition of ‘that which is’ or suchlike, as when I say ‘Socrates is a human’, ‘Every human is an animal’, not by saying ‘He who is Socrates is a human’ or ‘Everything which is a human is an animal’, or suchlike.”³⁰

This is an allusion to further counterexamples to the formality of syllogisms, ones which do not involve trinitarian doctrines. For here and in his later *Summulae* Buridan notes that there are counterexamples to the syllogistic moods in propositions containing ampliative terms. For example:

Nullum mortuum est animal
Aliquis equus est mortuus
Ergo aliquis equus non est animal.

He comments:

“This syllogism exhibits an arrangement or form belonging to the fourth mood <of the first figure, sc. Ferio>, and yet the consequence is not valid, for the premises are true and the conclusion false.”³¹

The reason is that ‘mortuus’ ampliates ‘equus’ in the minor premise for past horses. So it is true that some horse is dead, even though nothing (presently) dead is an animal. He concludes that

“the <four> moods in the form just presented are not formally valid, for I maintain that a syllogism is formally valid if it does not have a counter-

³⁰ *Locc.citt.*: “Voco ‘modum communem et consuetum’ modum loquendi sine hac additione ‘quod est’, uel huiusmodi, ut si dico: Socrates est homo, Omnis homo est animal non dicendo: Qui est Socrates est homo uel: Omne quod est homo est animal aut huiusmodi.”

³¹ *Summulae de syllogismis*, ed. Joke Spruyt (Turnhout: Brepols 2010), 5.3.2, pp.34–35: “[I]sti modi, sicut nunc formati fuerunt, non tenent gratia formae. Dico autem illos tenere gratia formae qui in nullis terminis habent instantiam retenta consimili forma et ordinatione praemissarum et conclusionis. Isti autem modi patiuntur instantias propter terminos ampliatiuos, ut ‘nullum mortuum est animal, aliquis equus est mortuus; ergo aliquis equus non est animal’. Haec enim est ordinatio vel forma quarti modi, et tamen non valet consequentia, quia praemissae sunt verae et conclusio falsa.” Cf. *Summulae de Dialectica*, tr. Klima, p.326, where ‘homo’ replaces ‘equus’.

instance under the substitution of any terms retaining the same form and arrangement of the premises and the conclusion.”

Such counterexamples, where the middle term equivocates in having a broader, or even disparate, interpretation in the two premises, are familiar. At §24, for example, Thomas Wölfel gives an example:

“Corollary: this argument: ‘Everything capable of laughter or capable of braying is an ass, and no ass is capable of laughter, therefore something capable of braying or an ass is not an ass’, is not valid. The corollary is clear because it cannot be ruled by the *dici de omni* or by the *dici de nullo*. It is clear, because by reducing it to *Ferio*, the predicate of the minor premise will always be broader than the disjunctive term in the subject of the major premise, as is clear by observation.”

The original argument appears to have the form of *Fapesmo*, but the middle term equivocates. Its true form is: $XaW, YeZ / ZoX$, with $X = \text{‘ass’}$ (or equivalently, ‘bray or ass’, since all and only asses bray), $Y = \text{‘laugh’}$, $W = \text{‘laugh or bray’}$, $Z = \text{‘ass’}$. The fallacy is one of four terms, for W (‘laugh or bray’) is broader than Y (‘laugh’).

To return to Buridan’s example, a solution is at hand, namely to restrict the subject so that the predicate cannot amplify it: the trick is to insert ‘quod est’ between the determiner and the subject. That is, whereas ‘*Aliquis equus est mortuus*’ is true (since there are dead horses—‘*equus*’ here is amplified by ‘*mortuus*’ to supposit for both present and past horses, some of whom are dead), ‘*Aliquis quod est equus est mortuus*’ is false, since nothing which is now a horse is dead.³² With that insertion the syllogism is valid, albeit the minor premise is false. But for Buridan, without it, the original paralogism is invalid, and consequently syllogistic moods as customarily formulated are not formally valid. Thomas gives us some examples in §31: ‘A white thing was Socrates, and nothing black was white, therefore Socrates was not black’ appears to have the form of *Frisosomorum*, one of the indirect moods in the first figure which Aristotle mentions in ch.7 of the *Prior Analytics*. However, it is not properly of that form, since in the major premise (the first), ‘white’ is taken for what is or was white, but in the minor premise

³² For more on the doctrine of ampliation, see, e.g., Read, “Medieval Theories: Properties of Terms”, §4: <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/medieval-terms/#AmplRest>.

only for what is white. So it is not taken as broadly in the minor as in the major and the inference is not valid. Similarly, ‘Every man is alive, and a man is dead, therefore a dead thing is alive’ seems to be an instance of Datisi. But it is not really so, for ‘man’ suppositis for past men in the minor premise but not in the major.

Buridan proceeded to infer that the expository version of the trinitarian paralogism is invalid:

“For although [...] it is true to say that God is the Father and the same God is the Son, the conclusion which says that the Father is the Son would be false [...] Such syllogisms are invalid, where the most simple unity is the trinity of really distinct persons, for with respect to these, the following principle is not valid: ‘any things that are said to be identical with numerically one and the same thing are said to be identical with each other’.”³³

If no ampliative or divine terms are involved, the syllogistic moods are valid. But those involving ampliative or divine terms are not:

“[i]f these moods have to be rendered universally formally valid, then it is necessary to form the syllogisms, expository or otherwise, in the following manner: ‘Everything which is B is A and everything which is C is B; therefore, everything which is C is A’.”³⁴

Atanasio González notes that Albert of Saxony concurs with Buridan’s claim that syllogisms containing ampliative or divine terms are valid only if formulated with the ‘which is’ expression.³⁵ Celarent is not formally valid, Albert claims, since there is a

³³ Buridan, *Summulae de Dialectica*, tr. Klima, p.327. Cf. *Summulae de syllogismis*, ed. Spruyt, pp.34–35: “Quia licet (loquendo de patre et filio in divinis) sit verum dicere quod Deus est pater et quod ille idem Deus est filius, tamen conclusio esset falsa dicens quod filius est pater [...] Non enim valent syllogismi ubi est simplicissima unitas trinitas personarum realiter distinctarum, quia in illis non tenet istud principium ‘Quaecumque uni et eidem in numero dicuntur eadem, illa dicuntur inter se eadem’.”

³⁴ *Loc.cit.*: “Si autem praedicti modi debent fieri universaliter formales, tunc oportet syllogismos, sive expositorys sive alios, formare sic ‘Omne quod est B est A; et omne quod est C est B; ergo omne quod est C est A’.”

³⁵ Atanasio González, ‘The Theory of Assertoric Consequences in Albert of Saxony’, *Franciscan Studies* 18 (1958), 290–354, 19 (1959), 13–114, p.90. See Albert von Sachsen, *Logik*, ed. H. Berger (Hamburg: Felix Meiner 2010), IV 7, p.730: “Nulli syllogismi sunt formales sine hac additione *quod est cum ly omne* vel *ly nihil*.” Note that González, following Albertus de Saxoniam, *Perutilis Logica* (Venetiis: Petrus Aurelius Sanutus 1522), fol.29vb, calls this ch.8.

counter-instance in that form: ‘No Father is the Son, every God is the Father, therefore no God is the Son’. But it becomes valid when we reformulate it as ‘Nothing which is the Father is the Son, every God is the Father, therefore no God is the Son’, in which the major premise is false—no surprise, for its contradictory, ‘Something which is the Father is the Son’ is true. For the divine essence is something which is the Father, and the same thing is the Son.³⁶

But González finds Albert’s account unclear, and accordingly refers the reader to Dorp’s *Perutile compendium totius logice Joannis Buridani* for elucidation. Dorp reiterates Buridan’s and Albert’s position, but then argues against it. Essentially, he impales them on the horns of a dilemma: either the trinitarian paralogisms are of the same form as the clearly valid syllogisms, in which case they are also valid and their major premise is as false and heretical as the conclusion; or they are not of the same form, and so are not in fact counter-instances to the formal validity of the syllogistic moods:

“The first doubt is whether the first four moods in the first figure, concluding directly, are formal inferences. One customarily responds to the doubt with two conclusions. The first: if we form syllogisms in these four moods in the first figure in the usual way, then they are not formal inferences [...] But one argues against this conclusion: for these propositions, ‘Every A is B’ and ‘Everything which is A is B’ are altogether of the same form. Therefore, if the four moods of the first figure are formal inferences by adding ‘which is’, they will also be formal inferences by not adding it. The inference is self-evident, and the premise is proved because the said propositions are of the same quality and quantity, have the same placement and order of the terms, and have the same copula. Yet there does not seem to be any other condition for belonging to the form of the proposition. Moreover, in these two propositions, ‘Every A is B’ and ‘Everything which is A is B’, ‘A’ is distributed in the same way, and thus

³⁶ *Logik*, ed. Berger, pp.730–732: “[...] quia invenitur instantia in aliis terminis, non enim sequitur ‘Nullus pater est filius, omnis deus est pater, ergo nullus deus est filius’, nam praemissae sunt verae et conclusio est falsa. Bene tamen sequitur ‘Nihil quod est pater est filius, omnis deus est pater, ergo nullus deus est filius’, sed quia maior est falsa, non mirum, quod conclusio est falsa. Haec enim est falsa ‘Nihil quod est pater est filius’, eo quod eius contradictoria est vera, scilicet ‘Aliquid quod est pater est filius’, nam essentia divina est aliquid quod est pater, et illa eadem est filius.”

there will be the same sense of these propositions and the same truth and falsity.”³⁷

Dorp considers a response to that second argument, to the effect that ‘A’ is distributed in the same way in ‘Every A is B’ and ‘Everything which is A is B’:

“To the second argument: one denies that in the said propositions ‘A’ is distributed in the same way, and one also denies that the sense of these propositions is the same, because the sense of ‘Every A is B’ is explicated like this: ‘Some A is B and there is no A which is not B’, and the sense of ‘Everything which A is B’ is explicated like this: ‘Some A is B and there is no A which is not B,³⁸ nor is there any thing which is A which is not B’; and the diversity of these senses arises from the diversity of the distributions, because that determiner ‘every’ only has the power to distribute a term by a distribution falling within the term, and ‘everything which is’ has the power to distribute a term with a distribution falling within the term and beyond the term, and in this way it is clear what should be said to the said doubt regarding the said mood.”³⁹

³⁷ Dorp, *Perutile compendium totius logice Joannis Buridani*, sig.M3rb (*Summulae Buridani*, sig.O3ra–b): “Dubitatur primo utrum quattuor modi prime figure directe concludentes sint consequentie formales. Ad dubium solet communiter responderi per duas conclusiones. Prima est: formando sillogismos in quattuor modis prime figure secundum solitum modum: tunc non sunt consequentie formales [...] Sed contra conclusionem arguitur: Nam iste propositiones ‘omne a est b’ et ‘omne quod est a est b’ sunt omnino eiusdem forme. Si ergo quattuor modi prime figure sint consequentie formales addendo ly quod est etiam erunt consequentie formales non addendo. Consequentia tenet de se, antecedens probatur, quia dicte propositiones sunt eiusdem qualitatis et quantitatis, eiusdem situs et ordinis terminorum, et eiusdem copule. Modo non videtur que alia conditio se tenet ex parte forme propositionis. Item in istis duabus propositionibus ‘omne a est b’ et ‘omne quod est a est b’ ly a eodem modo distribuitur, et sic idem erit sensus illarum propositionum et eadem veritas et falsitas.”

³⁸ There is a homoeoteleutic omission here in the 1499 edition: “and the sense of ‘Everything which A is B’ is explicated like this: ‘Some A is B and there is no A which is not B’ is present in the edition published in Lyon in 1512 (sig. O3rb) but not in the 1499 edition.

³⁹ Locc.citt.: “Ad secundam, negatur quod in dictis propositionibus ly a eodem modo distribuitur, et etiam negatur quod illarum propositionum sit idem sensus, quia sensus huius omne a est b sic explicatur: aliquod a est b, et non est aliquod a quin sit b, et sensus huius omne quod est a est b sic explicatur: aliquod a est b et non est aliquod a quin sit b, nec est aliqua res que sit a quin sit b, et diversitas istorum sensuum provenit ex diversitate distributionum, quia illud signum ‘omne’ precise habet virtutem distribuendi terminum distributione cadente infra terminum, et ly omne quod est habet virtutem distribuendi terminum distributione cadente infra terminum et extra terminum, et sic patet quid est dicendum ad dictum dubium secundum dictum modum.”

The allusion here to the power of a term to distribute a term in different ways harks back to Dorp's discussion of the *dici de omni et nullo*, where he raised a doubt "whether every universality or distribution in an affirmative proposition suffices for the *dici de omni* to apply." In his reply, Dorp makes a distinction also made by Thomas Wölfel (§§10–13):

"For the solution to the doubt, it should be noted that the universality or distribution of any term is three-fold: some is explicated by singular propositions in which a term originally distributed is singularized by demonstrative pronouns without adding another term of a different kind, e.g., supposing in 'Every A is B', the universality or distribution is explicated like this: 'This A is B, and this A is B, and there is not any A which is not B'. Then there is the required distribution, and it is called distribution within the term (*in termino*). Another is distribution which is explicated by singular propositions in which a term originally distributed is singularized by demonstrative pronouns adding a term of a different kind.⁴⁰ Therefore, if the sense of the proposition 'Every A is B' is explicated like this: 'This A is B, and this A is B, and there is not any A which is not B, nor is there any thing which is A and not B', then there is the required distribution, and it is called distribution within the term and beyond the term (*extra terminum*). The third is the universality of a term which is explicated by singular propositions in which a term originally distributed is singularized by demonstrative pronouns adding a term of a different kind and in a different number.⁴¹ Therefore, if the sense of 'Every A is B' is explicated like this: 'This A is B, and this A is B, and there is not any A which is not B, nor are there any things which are A which are not such that

⁴⁰ The example shows that the term "of a different kind" (*alterius rationis*) is in fact a transcendental term such as 'thing' (*res*) or 'being' (*ens*). Maierù ('À propos de la doctrine de la supposition en théologie trinitaire au XIV^e siècle', in *Medieval Semantics and Metaphysics*, ed. E.P Bos, Nijmegen: Ingenium 1985, 221–38, p.233) observes that the three-fold distinction of modes of distribution is also found in Peter Crockaert's *Summularum artis dialecticae utilis admodum interpretatio Petri de bruxellis super textum magistri Petri hispani* (Lugduni: Johannes Cleyn 1512), fol.h1rb–va, where the text confirms the use of a transcendental term: "Et distributio in termino et extra terminum explicatur per singulares predictas et capiendo singulares sumptas per transcendens eiusdem numeri ... Universalitas in termino et extra terminum et extra numerum explicatur per predicatam cum hoc assumendo transcendens alterius numeri ... Et hec vocatur 'distributio completa', faciens propositionem de omni."

⁴¹ That is, plural in place of singular.

they are a thing which is B', then there is the required distribution, and it is called distribution within the term, beyond the term and beyond the number (extra numerum).⁴²

Thomas Wölfel calls the third mode more succinctly, “complete distribution” (§13). That third kind of explication (including “extra numerum”, beyond the number) is designed precisely to accommodate the trinitarian paralogisms. Though the term ‘singularizatio’ seems new to Thomas’s times, the idea of cashing out the supposition of a term by descending to singular propositions was standard practice from at least the early fourteenth century.⁴³

The same three-fold distinction is found in the by John of Mueldorf’s *Quaestio*, in slightly different language:

“Sixthly, it follows that by reason of the special mode of being which the said opinion posits in things, three modes of universalizing propositions specifically distinct from those which sustain it rationally should be posited. Proof: from the said mode of being of things there follows a three-fold universalization, the second mode of which adds to the first and the third to the second, and such a mode of being in reality can only be preserved if

⁴² Dorp, *Perutile compendium totius logice Joannis Buridani*, sig. L5vb (*Summulae Buridani*, sig.N6rb–va): “Circa quod dubitatur primo utrum ad hoc quod in aliqua propositione affirmativa sit dici de omni prioristicum quelibet universalitas seu distributio sufficiat. Pro solutione dubii est notandum quod triplex est universalitas seu distributio alicuius termini. Quedam est que explicatur per propositiones singulares in quibus terminus prius distributus singularizatur per pronomina demonstrativa non assumendo aliquem alium (alium *om.* 1499) terminum alterius rationis, ut si in ista: 'Omne A est B', universalitas seu distributio sic explicetur: 'Hoc A est B, et hoc A est B, et non est aliquod A quin sit B' tunc ibi est debita distributio et vocatur distributio in termino. Alia est distributio que explicatur per propositiones singulares in quibus terminus prius distributus singularizatur per pronomina demonstrativa, cum hoc assumendo terminum alterius rationis; ergo si sensus huius propositionis: 'Omne A est B,' sic explicetur: 'Hoc A est B, et hoc A est B, et non est aliquod A quin sit B, nec est aliqua res que sit A quin sit B,' tunc ibi est debita distributio, et vocatur distributio in termino et extra terminum. Tertia est universalitas termini que explicatur per propositiones singulares in quibus terminus prius distributus singularizatur per pronomina demonstrativa, cum hoc assumendo terminus alterius rationis et alterius numeri; ergo si sensus huius: 'Omne A est B' sic explicetur: 'Hoc A est B, et hoc A est B, et non est aliquod A quin sit B, nec sunt aliqua res que sunt A quin tales sint res que sit B' tunc ibi est debita distributio, et vocatur distributio in termino, extra terminum, et extra numerum.” Note that the text of the explication in that third case should not be “corrected” as González does (p.92 n.37 line 1 up) from ‘sit’ to ‘sint’: in the case of the Trinity, three things (the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit) are one thing (the divine essence) which itself is one thing (God).

⁴³ See, e.g., Paul Vincent Spade, ‘The logic of the categorical: the medieval theory of descent and ascent’, in *Meaning and Inference in Medieval Philosophy*, ed. N. Kretzmann (Dordrecht: Kluwer 1988), 187–224.

such a triple mode of universalization is granted in the proposition; therefore, etc. The first premise is proved because it is first necessary according to this opinion to grant a mode of universalization which is resolved and explicated by the singularization of the distributed term alone, without adding any term of a different kind; and in this way the said opinion has to grant ‘Every universal man is Plato’, because there is a true descent to ‘This universal man is Plato and this universal man is Plato and there is no universal man which is not Plato’; therefore, etc. And this mode would be appropriately called universalization or distribution in the term distributed, or within the term, as others call it. The second premise is proved because there is another way of universalizing, which is explicated by the singularization of the distributed term, by adding a general term or terms of a different kind, of which the subject is truly said to be distributed in the same number as the subject, and in this way the said opinion would have to deny ‘Every universal man is Plato’, because this conjunction: ‘This universal man is Plato and this universal man is Plato and there is nothing or no one or any thing who or what is a universal man and is not Plato’ should be denied; and this mode of universalization can be called distribution beyond the term in the same number as the term distributed; and it is clear that this mode adds more to the first addition. The third premise is proved, because it yields a mode of universalizing which adds to the addition of the second mode the further addition of plurality [complexio]. According to this mode ‘Every universal man is a singular man’, which would be granted according to the first and second modes, would be denied by the said opinion because no plurality of things which are a universal man are one singular man; therefore, etc.”⁴⁴

⁴⁴ Auer, ‘Die aristotelische Logik in der Trinitätslehre’, pp.479–80: “Sexto sequitur quod ratione specialis modi essendi, quem dicta positio ponit in rebus, tres modi universalisandi propositiones specificè distincti a sustentibus eam rationabiliter sunt ponendi. Probatur: ex dicto modo essendi rerum sequitur triplex universalisatio, quarum secunda addit super primam et tertia super secundam et non potest salvari modus essendi talis in re, nisi concedatur talis triplex modus universalisandi in propositione; igitur etc. Antecedentis prima pars probatur quia oportet primo iuxta istam positionem concedere modum universalisationis qui resolvitur et explicatur per singularisationem solius termini distributi nullum

Thomas's claim, in accord with Dorp and Henry Totting and his followers, is that 'omnis' has in itself the power of distributing beyond the term and beyond the number, without any need to add 'which is'.⁴⁵ He makes this clear at §13 where he explicates 'Every man is an animal' as 'Every being which is or beings which are a man is or are an animal'. Nonetheless, that distribution is equivocal—it can be understood in three different ways. That explains why the major premise of the trinitarian paralogism misleads us: if, for example, 'omnis' in 'omnis deus' is understood as distributing 'deus' within the term (in termino), the premise is true, as Thomas says at §15: God is the Father and there is no God which is not the Father. But if 'omnis' in 'omnis deus' is understood as distributing 'deus' completely (iuxta distributionem completam), that premise is false. There is a God which is not the Father.

There is a metaphysical background to all this, invoking Platonist realism.⁴⁶ Humanity is a single being present in every single human. So

“‘Every universal man is a singular man’ should be granted according to distribution beyond the term, because it is equivalent to: ‘Every one thing which is a universal man is a singular man’, and this is true,”

as Thomas remarks at §14. But

terminum alterius rationis coassumendo; et isto modo dicta [pro]positio habet concedere hanc ‘omnis universalis homo est Plato’, quia vere sic descenditur ‘iste universalis homo est Plato et iste universalis homo est Plato et non est aliquis universalis homo quin iste sit Plato’; igitur etc. Et iste modus convenienter vocaretur universalisatio vel distributio in termino distributo seu infra terminum, ut alii dicunt. Secunda pars antecedentis probatur quia alius est modus universalisandi, qui explicatur per singularisationem termini distributi, coassumendo terminum vel terminos communes alterius rationis, de quibus vere dicitur subiectum distributum in eodem numero cum subiecto et isto modo dicta opinio haberet negare hanc ‘omnis universalis homo est Plato’, quia ista copulativa esset neganda ‘iste universalis homo est Plato et iste universalis homo est Plato et non est aliquid vel aliquis vel aliqua res qui vel quae vel quod sit universalis homo et non sit Plato’; et iste modus universalisationis vocari potest distributio extra terminum in eodem numero cum ipso termino distributo; et patet quod iste modus addit supra primum extrasumptionem. Tertia pars antecedentis probatur, quia est dare modum universalisandi, qui addit supra extrasumptionem secundi modi extrasumptionem complexionum vel complexorum. Secundum quem modum una cum dicta opinione esset neganda ista ‘omnis universalis homo est singularis homo’, quae cum esset concedenda iuxta primum et secundum modos, quia nullae plures res, quae sunt universalis homo, sunt unus singularis homo; igitur etc.” Cf. Maierù, ‘Logica aristotelica e teologia trinitaria’, pp.500–501.

⁴⁵ See also González, ‘The theory of consequences in Albert of Saxony’, pp.93–94.

⁴⁶ See, e.g., Auer, ‘Die aristotelische Logik in der Trinitätslehre’, pp.468–9. It is alluded to by Thomas in §32. See also Maierù’s discussion in ‘*Ymaginationes manufactivae*: logic and trinitarian theology in Peter of Pulkau’, in *Trinitarian Theology in the Medieval West*, 226-255.

“‘Every universal man is Socrates’ is false according to distribution beyond the term, because it is equivalent to ‘Every thing which is a universal man is Socrates’. But this is false, because Plato is a thing which is a universal man, but he is not Socrates.”

Here Thomas is following John of Mueldorf, as we saw above, where ‘*omnis universalis homo est Plato*’ is repeatedly glossed, first “in termino” as ‘*iste universalis homo est Plato et iste universalis homo est Plato et non est aliquis universalis homo quin iste sit Plato*’, then “extra terminum” as ‘*iste universalis homo est Plato et iste universalis homo est Plato et non est aliquid vel aliquis vel aliqua res, qui vel quae vel quod sit universalis homo et non sit Plato*’, and finally adding the clause “extra numerum”: ‘*et nullae plures res, quae sunt universalis homo, sunt unus singularis homo*’, e.g., Plato.

Thomas’s interim conclusion (§32) is that the *dici de omni et nullo*, the basis of Aristotle’s theory of the syllogism, requires that any distributed terms are distributed by a complete distribution, that is, within and beyond the term and beyond the number. Accordingly, the second trinitarian paralogism we noted at the beginning will be valid, but will have a false major premise to fit its false conclusion. But this is not enough in itself to deal with every counter-example to the formality of the syllogism. Thomas’s example (§33) is:

Pater generat
Omnis Pater est essentia divina
Igitur essentia divina generat.

Taking the major premise and the conclusion as particular affirmatives, it’s an example of *Disamis* in the third figure. But even taking the minor premise (‘*Omnis Pater est essentia divina*’) in complete distribution, the premises are true and the conclusion false. His solution is to introduce the further three-fold distinction of modes of particularization, that is, of ways of forming particular propositions,⁴⁷ which he does in §§17–20. Once again, these are ways of adding (or not adding) ‘*quod est*’-phrases, so that the explication of complete particularization requires the addition of ‘thing which or things which’ (§20). Then the complete particularization of the conclusion is expressed by ‘*Ens vel entia quod vel que <est vel> sunt essentia divina est vel sunt generans*’, which is true because the

⁴⁷ See footnote 14.

Father is something which is the divine essence and He generates. Nonetheless, just as ‘omnis’ has the power of distributing beyond the term and beyond the number, without any need to add ‘which is’, so too does ‘some’ have the power to particularize completely. Thomas says at §21:

“So also ‘some’ insofar as it particularizes completely is not equivalent formally to ‘being which or beings which’, but only virtually.”

González realises that the qualifications ‘formally’ and ‘virtually’ (formaliter et virtualiter) deserve comment.⁴⁸ The qualification ‘virtualiter’ was famously used by Buridan in his revised solution to the insolubles, when he said that every proposition (as I would translate it) “has the power to imply” its own truth:

“Ideo dicitur aliter, propinquius veritati, scilicet quod quaelibet propositio implicat virtualiter aliam propositionem qua de subiecto pro ea supponente affirmaretur hoc praedicatum ‘verum’; dico ‘implicat virtualiter’ sicut antecedens implicat illud quod ad ipsum sequitur.”⁴⁹

Klima’s translation, like Scott’s and Hughes’s, rendering ‘implicat virtualiter’ as ‘virtually implies’, is at best unhelpful and at worst misleading, suggesting the one proposition almost implies the other but somehow fails.⁵⁰ For explanation, González refers us to a passage from Michael of Breslau’s *Introductorium dialecticae*.⁵¹

“Syllogismus expository est duplex: expository virtualiter est syllogismus cuius medium est terminus communis restrictus in una praemissarum per relativum identitatis, ut ‘iste homo est animal, et Socrates est idem animal, ergo Socrates est iste homo’; expository formaliter est cuius medium est terminus singularis singulariter tentus et est duplex: perfectus est qui manifeste regulatur per hoc principium: quecumque uni et eidem sunt eadem inter se sunt eadem, ut sunt syllogismi expository tertie

⁴⁸ González, ‘The theory of consequences in Albert of Saxony’, p.89 n.32.

⁴⁹ Buridan, *Summulae de Practica Sophismatum*, ed. F. Pironet (Turnhout: Brepols 2004), 155.

⁵⁰ *Summulae de Dialectica*, tr. Klima, 969; *Sophisms on Meaning and Truth*, tr. T.K. Scott (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts 1966), 195; G.E. Hughes, *John Buridan on Self-Reference* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1982), 49.

⁵¹ González cites it from C. Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande*, vol. IV (Leipzig: Hirzel 1870), p. 264.

figure, ut ‘hoc currit et hoc est homo, ergo homo currit’; imperfectus est qui non manifeste regulatur per hoc principium: quecumque uni et eidem sunt eadem etc, ut sunt syllogismi prime et secunde figura, ut ‘hoc est homo et risibile est hoc, ergo risibile est homo’. Et tales reducuntur ad syllogismos tertie figure.”⁵²

The important lesson is that ‘virtualiter’ is when the middle term has the power of singularization, but is not itself singular; ‘formaliter’ when it is explicitly a singular term used singularly. So too for particularization and universalization (or distribution): signs like ‘aliquis’ and ‘omnis’ have the power to particularize and universalize completely the terms to which they are attached, as Thomas says regarding the Trinity (§32):

“‘Every humanity is a person’ [...] is equivalent to ‘Every one thing which is a humanity is a person’, at least virtually (virtualiter).”

Indeed, Dorp adds a further argument to show that it is unnecessary to add the ‘which is’-phrases explicitly, for they are implicit in the copula:

“For the ampliation arises by reason of some copula or by reason of some expression including some copula. But the copula belongs to the form of the proposition; e.g., these are not of the same form: ‘A man is an animal’ and ‘A man is generated’. Moreover, ampliative terms were clearly the same for Aristotle as they are for us: therefore, if for syllogizing formally it was necessary to add ‘which is’ on account of ampliative terms Aristotle would add them everywhere; nor should it be said according to this that it is necessary to add ‘which is’ on account of terms in divine terms, because ‘which is’ belongs to the predicate or to the subject; not to the subject, because then that would not change the form, but only the matter of the proposition, because it would change the proposition in which ‘which is’ was placed in the subject of the proposition. But the subject is the matter of the proposition and not the form.”⁵³

⁵² Michael of Breslau (Michalis de Vratislavia), *Introductorium dialecticae quod congestum logicum appellatur* (Cracoviae: J.Haller 1509), sig.e4v–e5r.

⁵³ Dorp, *Perutile compendium totius logice Joannis Buridani*, sig.M3rb (*Summulae Buridani*, sig.O3rb–va): “Nam ampliatio provenit ratione alicuius copule vel ratione alicuius dictionis aliquam copulam includentis. Modo copula se tenet ex parte forme propositionis: ut iste non sunt eiusdem forme: homo est

Since, according to Aristotle, ampliation is part of the copula and so of the form, ‘which is’ is already, at least implicitly (virtualiter), part of the subject. As Henry Totting and his followers comment:

“If Aristotle had known the mysteries of our faith, he would have been able to distinguish the true syllogisms from the paralogisms in the doctrine of the Trinity without changing his doctrine of the syncategoremata and the doctrine of the generalization of concepts and propositions.”⁵⁴

Thomas also uses the term ‘virtualiter’ in his response to a further possible counterexample to the formality of the syllogism due to insoluble propositions. Consider the inference:

Omne consequens est falsum
et *B* est consequens
igitur *B* est falsum.

where the unstated scenario (*casus*) is that *B* is the conclusion and this is the only inference (*consequentia*). It appears to be a syllogism in Barbara. But the conclusion is paradoxical, for if it is true, it must be false (since that is what it seems to say), and so is not true; while if it is false, it must be true for the same reason. So it’s implicitly self-contradictory, true if and only if false. However, the premises are undoubtedly true: *B* is the conclusion of that inference by definition, and given that it’s the only inference, the first premise is also true. So we seem to have an invalid instance of Barbara, in which case Barbara is not formally valid, even though many of its instances are indeed valid.

What we have is an example of the Liar paradox, one of the logical paradoxes which the medievals called “insolubles”—not actually insoluble, they thought, but certainly difficult to solve. Many putative solutions were proposed, a common one being restrictivism, based on the principle that no term can supposit for any proposition in

animal et homo est generandus. Item apud Aristotelem ita bene erant termini ampliativi sicut apud nos: si ergo ad sillogizandum formaliter oportuisset addisse propter terminos ampliativos ly quod est Aristoteles ubique addisset. Nec est dicendum secundum quod oportet addere ly quod est propter terminos in divinis, quia hoc quod est se tenet a parte predicati vel a parte subiecti: non a parte subiecti: quia tunc non mutaret formam: sed precise materiam propositionis: quia faceret mutare propositionem in qua poneretur ly quod est in subiecto propositionis. Modo subiectum est materia propositionis et non forma.”

⁵⁴ See Auer, ‘Die aristotelische Logik in der Trinitätslehre der Spätscholastik’, p.490: “si Aristoteles nostrae fidei mysteria cognovisset, absque mutatione syncategorematum et modorum universalisandi propositiones, quas ipse posuit, inter veros syllogismos et paralogismos in divinis discernere potuisset.” Cf. pp.469–470.

which it itself occurs (at least in some cases).⁵⁵ There were many advocates of this solution, differing in detail in the exact shape of their proposal and in the ground for the restriction. One of the most influential was Walter Burley, who wrote in around 1302:

“One should realise that a part never supposits for the whole of which it is part when, putting the whole in the place of the part, what results is reflection of the same on itself with a privative determination.”⁵⁶

The reason, Burley claimed, was that everyone saying anything asserts that what he says is true, so if anyone says that what he is saying is false he asserts both that it is true and that it is false, and so asserts opposites.⁵⁷

Whatever Thomas’s own reason for favouring this solution, it is clearly the solution he invokes (§55). Accordingly, the problematic inference is not in fact an instance of Barbara, because there is essentially a fallacy of four terms: ‘falsum’ equivocates, for in the first premise it supposits for the conclusion; but the occurrence of ‘falsum’ in the conclusion cannot supposit for the conclusion itself, given the restriction (§55): “a term whose supposition depends on the truth or falsity of the proposition is not taken for that of which it is part, nor does it supposit for it.” Consequently, the formality of Barbara is not impugned: one of the requirements (§34) for identity of form was that terms be taken in the same way. Nonetheless, Thomas’s final statement is cryptic: “Et sic illa insolubilis: ‘*B est falsum*’, tantum valet: *B est falsum non hoc, virtualiter sed non formaliter.*” This seems to mean that, as other restrictivists put it, the conclusion of the inference, *B*, is equivalent, but not formally equivalent, to the claim that *B* is a falsehood other than this one.⁵⁸

⁵⁵ On restrictivism as an approach to insolubles, see Spade and Read, ‘Insolubles’ §2.4: <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/insolubles/#TheoRest>.

⁵⁶ Walter Burley, *Insolubilia*, in M.-L. Roure, ‘La problématique des propositions insolubles au XIII^e siècle et au début du XIV^e, suivie de l’édition des traités de W. Shyreswood, W. Burleigh et Th. Bradwardine’, *Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 36–37 (1970), 262–84, §3.03: “Ulterius sciendum quod nunquam supponit pars pro toto cuius est pars quando, posito toto loco partis, accidit reflexio eiusdem supra se ipsum cum determinatione privativa.”

⁵⁷ Burley, *Insolubilia*, §3.02: “Nam quilibet dicens asserit suum dictum esse verum; sed qui dicit se dicere falsum asserit suum dictum esse falsum. Ideo qui dicit se dicere falsum asserit suum dictum esse verum et falsum et ita asserit opposita.”

⁵⁸ This is how another restrictivist, Walter Segrave, defending restrictivism against the sustained attack on it by Thomas Bradwardine, chose to express the meaning of such insolubles. See Walter Segrave, *Insolubilia*, ed. Stephen Read and Barbara Bartocci (Cambridge: Open Book Publishers 2024), §6.8.1:

That still leaves the first paralogism we noted at the beginning and its like, the expository trinitarian syllogism. To recall, the expository syllogism infers a particular conclusion from two singular statements about one and the same thing. As Thomas observes in §42, if the singular terms in each premise do not stand for the same thing, the inference does not have the form of an expository syllogism. The singular terms are the middle term in this kind of syllogism, and the first of the three standard conditions for validity of the categorical syllogism is that the middle term be distributed at least once in the premises.⁵⁹ So we must distribute the middle term, and our paralogism becomes:

Omne quod est haec essentia est filius
Omne quod est haec essentia est pater
Ergo pater est filius,

where ‘omne’ is taken in complete distribution or universalization (see §§46–47). But then the premises are as false as the conclusion.

Wulderstorff’s challenge was to defend the claim that categorical syllogisms are formally valid. That understanding of syllogism seems to follow naturally from Aristotle’s development of the theory in terms of three figures presenting two categorical premises containing three terms represented by dummy letters. Yet there seem to be counterexamples to this interpretation of the Philosopher’s pre-eminent theory of logic and argument, in the case of ampliation, in insolubles, and most importantly, in the Trinity. In mounting that defence, Thomas needed to make clear what counts as formal consequence, that is, as validity in virtue of form. In the fourteenth century, two different accounts of form and of formal consequence had been defended, one using the containment principle, dominant at Oxford, the other using the notion of uniform substitution, dominant at Paris. Thomas makes clear his adherence to the Parisian notion,

“iste terminus ‘falsum’ numquam supponit totum cuius est pars nec in affirmativa nec in negativa, sed est sensus semper talis: ‘Falsum est’, idest falsum aliud ab hoc est, similiter ‘Nullum falsum est’, idest nullum falsum aliud ab hoc.”

⁵⁹ The three general conditions for a syllogism are that the middle term is distributed at least once, any term distributed in the conclusion must be distributed in its premise, and that the conclusion is negative if and only if exactly one premise is negative. See, e.g., Buridan, *Treatise on Consequences*, III 4 Eighth Conclusion (p.122): “It should be noted that by these three Conclusions, that is, the sixth, seventh and eighth, and by the second, the number of all the useful ways of syllogizing in any of the three figures both direct and indirect is made manifest.” (ed. Hubien, p.91: Notandum est quod per istas tres conclusiones, scilicet sextam, septimam et octauam, et per secundam, manifestus est numerus omnium modorum utilium ad syllogizandum in unaquaque trium figurarum tam directe quam indirecte.)

passing over the alternative conception in silence. Identity of form requires four things, he writes (§34):

“It should be noted that there are four requirements for identity of form, namely the same way of being taken, the same quality, the same position of the terms, and identity of kind of the syncategorematic expressions.”

Take the first trinitarian counterexample mentioned above: “Haec essentia est filius, haec essentia est pater, ergo pater est filius.” As it stands, he says (§§46–47), it is not universally valid: one must add ‘omne quod est’ before the singular term ‘haec essentia’. Even then it is ambiguous. The distributed term ‘omne quod est haec essentia’ can be taken in three ways, for the distribution can be taken within the term, or additionally beyond the term, or in complete distribution. Only when taken in that last way, with complete distribution, is the inference valid. But taken that way, the premises are as false as the conclusion, and so it presents no challenge to the formal validity of the syllogistic schemata.

This general approach to the counterexamples is not original to Thomas. The need for restriction on the supposition of the subject term in ampliative contexts is found as early as John Buridan’s *Treatise on Consequences* (around 1340), as is the explication of formality in terms of uniform substitution; the three-fold distinction of modes of distribution in application to the trinitarian paralogisms is found not only in Henry Totting’s *Abbreviatio* of Adam Wodeham’s *Sentences Commentary* (composed in Paris between 1373 and 1378),⁶⁰ but also in John Dorp’s *Summulae Buridani* (around 1400). Nonetheless, the various notions and techniques developed over the century before his *Quodlibetal* debate are skilfully handled and Thomas acquits himself in style.

⁶⁰ For the dating, see Courtenay, *Adam Wodeham*, p.147.

Melk 958, Quodlibetal question 9

Edited by Christopher Schabel and Stephen Read

[M 474]

Magister Thomas de Wulderstarff.

Utrum omnes modi prime figure teneant gratia forme.

[1] Quod sic arguitur auctoritate Aristotelis, primo *Priorum*, qui videtur hoc velle.¹

[2] In oppositum arguitur, quia non omnia argumenta in barbara sunt formalia, igitur.

[3] Respondendo ad istam questionem, ego divido eam in duos articulos, quorum primus erit de modis prime figure, secundus de formalitate.

<Articulus primus>

[4] Quantum igitur ad primum, noto quod prima figura habet 19 modos, et hoc capiendo modum pro premissis et conclusione simul et non distinguendo quartam figuram a prima. Patet hoc notabile, quia in prima figura sunt 19 diverse ordinationes premissarum et conclusionum in determinata qualitate et quantitate et situ terminorum, igitur sunt 19 modi diversi.² Consequentia tenet, quia ex diversa ordinatione premissarum et conclusionum in determinata qualitate et quantitate et situ terminorum arguitur diversitas modorum. Et isti 19 modi patent in istis metris:

Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferion, Baraliopton

Celantes, Dabitis, Fapesmo, Frisesomorum

Barbara, Celaront, Barbari, Didari, Fieronque

Calerent, Caleron, Celantes, Calentes, Calenton

[5] Secundo noto quod syllogismus secundum Aristotelem, primo *Priorum*, sic describitur:³ “<Syllogismus> est oratio in qua quibusdam positis aliud quidem ab hiis que posita sunt ex necessitate accidit eo quod hec sunt.” Et hanc diffinitionem

¹ Aristoteles, *Analytica priora* I c.4.

² diversi] 13^o *add. sed del. M*

³ Aristoteles, *Analytica priora*, tr. Boethius (recensio Florentina), I c.1. See *Aristoteles Latinus* III.1-4, 6.

Aristoteles intellexit de syllogismo kategorico, quia non accidit syllogismum yppotheticum esse syllogismum, ut patet auctoritate [M 475] Aristotelis 5^o tractatu, capitulo 3^o, ubi dicit:⁴ “Palam autem et quoniam demonstratio omnis erit per tres terminos et non per plures.” Et in eodem tractatu, capitulo primo, dicit:⁵ Quoniam “omnis qui fit per aliquam illarum trium figurarum fit.” Et debet diffinitio intelligi ad hunc sensum: <Syllogismus> est propositio yppothetica habens duas⁶ orationes adinvicem copulative coniunctas pro antecedente et alias⁷ ab hiis et a qualibet earum in significatione pro consequente que sequitur formaliter ex hiis mediante nota conditionali rationali gratia formalis connexionis extremitatum cum medio in premissis gratia cuius connexionis extremitates coniunguntur in conclusione.

[6] Correlarium primum: arguendo ab inducentibus ad inductam non est syllogismus ut sic, videlicet: ‘Iste homo est animal et iste homo est animal et sic de aliis, ergo omnis homo est animal’, quia hoc argumentum non tenet gratia connexionis extremitatum cum medio in premissis, ut patet advertenti.

[7] Correlarium secundum: arguendo ab exponentibus ad expositam non est syllogismus, quia conclusio non est alia a premissis in significatione, sed synonyma cum premissis, et hoc supposito quod sint yppothetice. Si autem sunt kategorice, adhuc non est syllogismus. Patet, quia tale argumentum non tenet gratia connexionis.

[8] Correlarium tertium: hic non est syllogismus: ‘Homo est animal et nihil est homo quin ipsum sit animal, ergo omnis homo est animal’, quia non⁸ tenet gratia connexionis extremitatum etc. Nec est argumentum formale, quia in simili non sequitur: ‘Homo est animal et nulla chymera est homo quin ipsa sit animal, igitur omnis⁹ chymera est animal’. Ibi enim totum antecedens est verum et consequens falsum. Quod autem sit similis forme patet, quia loco ly ‘nichil’ pono ly ‘nulla chymera’, et capio ly ‘chymera’ in ordine ad unum simplicem conceptum.

⁴ Aristoteles, *Analytica priora*, tr. Boethius (recensio Florentina et Carnutensis), I c.25. See *Aristoteles Latinus* III.1-4, 54.

⁵ Aristoteles, *Analytica priora*, tr. Boethius (recensio Florentina et Carnutensis), I c.23. See *Aristoteles Latinus* III.1-4, 50.

⁶ duas] *p.c. M*

⁷ alias] *alia a.c. M*

⁸ non] *s.l. M*

⁹ omnis] *homo est animal add. sed del. M*

[9] Correlarium quartum: hic non est syllogismus: ‘Si omne animal est substantia et omnis homo est animal, omnis homo est substantia’. Similiter hic: ‘Quia omne animal est rationale et omnis homo est animal, omnis homo est rationalis’. Patet, quia conclusio non sequitur ex premissis mediante nota conditionali rationali, quod tamen requiritur, ut patet ex diffinitione. Et Aristoteles in exemplis suis ponit notam rationalem, et cum vocat syllogismum demonstrationem. Modo omnis demonstratio fit per notam rationalem, sive sit kategorica sive yppothetica.

[10] Tertio noto pro dicendis quod triplex est distributio, scilicet in termino, extra terminum, et completa distributio.

[11] In termino est distributio que explicatur per singularizationem solius termini distributi non assumendo terminum alterius rationis. Exemplum: ‘Omnis homo est animal’, capiendo ly ‘omnis’ prout facit distributionem in termino, explicatur sic: ‘Iste homo est animal et iste homo est animal et sic de aliis’. Et non debet addi explicando talem distributionem ly ‘res que’ vel ‘ens quod’. Et ad veritatem talis requiritur veritas unius¹⁰ copulative constitute ex omnibus singularibus talis propositionis in qua distribuitur terminus in termino ad bonum sensum, scilicet quod nulla eius singularis sit falsa, vel¹¹ ad veritatem talis requiritur veritas unius simplicis exponentis, ut ad veritatem istius: ‘Omnis homo est animal’, requiritur veritas illius copulative: ‘Iste homo est animal et iste homo est animal et sic de aliis’, vel veritas istius exponentis simplicis: ‘Homo est animal et nihil est homo quin ipsum sit animal, ergo omnis homo est animal’. Et vocatur ‘distributio in termino’ quia non assumit terminum alterius rationis.

[12] Sed distributio extra [M 476] terminum est distributio que explicatur per singularizationem termini distributi assumendo terminum alterius¹² rationis, in eodem tamen numero, ut¹³ ‘Omnis homo est animal’, distributio debet sic exprimi: ‘Omnis res que est homo est animal’, et ad veritatem talis requiritur veritas copulative constitute ex omnibus singularibus talis propositionis in qua singularizatur ly ‘res que’ vel ‘ens quod’ per terminum taliter distributum, ut ‘Omnis homo est animal’ requiritur ad veritatem ipsius quod ista copulativa sit vera: ‘Ista res que est homo est animal et ista res que est homo est animal et sic de aliis’. Et vocatur ‘distributio extra terminum’ quia explicando

¹⁰ unius] copulative simplicis exponentis ut ad veritatem istius *add. sed del. M*

¹¹ vel] *iter a.c. M*

¹² alterius] in *add. sed del. M*

¹³ ut] on *add. sed del. M*

talem distributionem assumitur terminus alterius rationis, in eodem tamen numero, scilicet ly ‘res que’.

[13] Sed distributio completa est qua distribuitur aliquis terminus que exprimi debet per hoc additum ‘ens quod vel entia que’. Exemplum: ‘Omnis homo est animal’ exprimitur sic: ‘Omne ens vel entia quod vel que est vel sunt homo est vel sunt animal’. Et ad veritatem talis requiritur veritas talis copulative: ‘Illud¹⁴ ens vel entia quod vel que est vel sunt homo est vel sunt animal, et illud ens vel entia quod vel que est vel sunt homo est vel sunt animal, et sic de aliis’.

[14] Ex quo patet quod ista: ‘Omnis universalis homo est¹⁵ singularis homo’ est concedenda iuxta distributionem extra terminum, quia valet tantum: ‘Omnis una res que est universalis homo est singularis homo’, et hoc est verum. Sed illa: ‘Omnis universalis homo est Sortes’ est falsa secundum distributionem extra terminum, quia valet tantum: ‘Omnis res que est universalis homo est Sortes’. Modo hoc est falsum, quia Plato est res que est universalis homo, et tamen non est Sortes.

[15] Ex quo sequitur secundo quod ille due sunt false: ‘Omnis universalis homo est singularis homo’, iuxta distributionem completam; similiter ista: ‘Omnis res in divinis est Pater vel Filius vel Spiritus Sanctus’, que tamen concedende essent iuxta distributionem in termino.

[16] Secundo sequitur quod ista est falsa iuxta distributionem completam: ‘Omnis universalis homo est Sortes’, que tamen concedenda esset¹⁶ iuxta distributionem in termino, ut patet advertenti, exprimendo talem distributionem. Et vocatur talis distributio ‘completa’ quia assumit terminum alterius rationis esse cum hoc in alio numero.

[17] Quarto noto quod sicut triplex est distributio, ita etiam triplex est particularizatio, scilicet in termino, extra terminum, et completa.

[18] Particularizatio in termino exprimitur per singularizationem talis particularis non addendo ly ‘res que’, ut ‘Quidam homo est animal’ <explicatur sic:> ‘iste homo est animal, vel¹⁷ iste homo est animal, et sic de aliis’.

¹⁴ illud] *mg. M*

¹⁵ est] sortes est falsa secundum distributionem extra terminum quia valet tantum *add. sed del. M*

¹⁶ esset] *p.c. M*

¹⁷ vel] *et a.c. s.l. M*

[19] Sed particularizatio extra terminum est que explicatur per singularizationem termini particularizati¹⁸ addendo terminum alterius rationis, ut ly ‘res que’. Exemplum: ‘Homo est animal’ <explicatur sic:> ‘ista res que est homo est animal, vel ista res que est homo est animal, et sic de aliis’.

[20] Sed particularizatio completa est que explicatur per hoc additum ‘ens quod vel entia que’ ad terminum complete particularizatum, ut hic: ‘homo est animal’ <explicatur sic:> ‘illud ens vel entia quod vel que est vel sunt homo est vel sunt animal¹⁹ vel illud ens vel entia quod vel que est vel sunt homo est vel sunt animal, et sic de aliis’.

[21] Quid autem requiratur ad veritatem talis et quare dicatur ‘particularizatio in termino’ vel ‘extra terminum’ faciliter habetur ex illis que dicta sunt de completa distributione. Et ly ‘omnis’ prout facit completam distributionem non valet tantum formaliter sicut ‘ens quod vel entia que’, sed solum virtualiter. Sic etiam ly ‘quidam’ prout complete particularizat non valet tantum <formaliter> sicut ly ‘ens quod vel entia que’, sed solum virtualiter.

[22] Istis sic notatis, sit prima propositio hec, scilicet: [M 477] Nedum ad syllogismum in modo prime figure, sed et ad syllogismum in modo alterius figure requiritur quod regulabilis sit per dici de omni vel dici de nullo.

[23] Probatur ista propositio, quia secundum Aristotelem primo *Priorum*,²⁰ et P(etrus) H(ispanus) tractatu quarto,²¹ dici de omni de dici de nullo sunt principia syllogismorum, et non sunt principia probativa, igitur regulativa. Antecedens patet. Minor probatur, quia argumentum in Barbara est ita evidens, ymo evidentius quam hoc principium dici de omni, et non oportet quodlibet principium esse evidentius illo respectu cuius est principium; sed bene hoc est verum de principio probativo; igitur relinquitur propositio vera.

[24] Correlarium: hoc argumentum, ‘Omne risibile vel rudibile est asinus, et nullus asinus est risibilis, igitur rudibile vel asinus non est asinus’, non est bonum. Patet hoc correlarium, quia non est regulabile per dici de omni vel dici de nullo. Patet, quia

¹⁸ termini particularizati] talis particularis a.c. mg. M

¹⁹ animal] homo a.c. s.l. M

²⁰ Aristoteles, *Analytica priora* I c.1. See, e.g., Albertus Magnus, *Liber I Priorum Analyticorum* I c.7: “Principia autem syllogismorum perfectorum sunt duo, scilicet dici de omni, et dici de nullo.”

²¹ Petrus Hispanus, *Tractatus*, ed. De Rijk, IV 1, p.43.

reducendo ipsum ad Ferion semper erit plus predicatum minoris quam disiunctum a parte subiecti in maiore, ut patet intuitu.

[25] Secunda propositio: ad hoc quod syllogismi mediate regulentur per dici de omni vel dici de nullo non oportet ipsos esse reducibiles ad alios syllogismos. Patet, quia alias non quodlibet argumentum in Baroco regularetur per dici de omni vel dici de nullo, ut patet de isto: ‘Omnis homo est animal, et homo non²² est animal, igitur homo non est homo’, quia reducendo ipsum per impossibile reducit ad hoc argumentum: ‘Omnis homo est animal, et omnis homo est homo, igitur omnis homo est animal’, quod argumentum tamen non est syllogismus.

[26] Correlarium: non solum syllogismi regulantur per dici de omni vel dici de nullo. Patet hoc de argumento immediato tacto, quod regulatur per dici de omni et quod non est syllogismus. Et similiter hoc: ‘Nullus homo est animal, et omnis homo est animal, igitur nullus homo est animal’, regulatur per dici de nullo et tamen non est syllogismus.

[27] Tertia propositio: ad debitam regulationem syllogismi non solum in prima figura sed etiam in aliis figuris requiritur quod medium distributum in obliquo in maiore debeat mutari in rectum in minore et esse predicatum et nichil plus nisi illud plus esset determinatio eius, et si talis determinatio supponeret determinate, addi deberet sibi relativum ydentitatis. Illa propositio patet de prima figura, quia hoc argumentum nichil valet: ‘Cuiuslibet hominis asinus currit, Brunellus est hominis asinus,²³ igitur Brunellus currit’, quia plus est predicatum minoris etc. Similiter probatur de tertia figura. Hoc argumentum non est in tertia figura: ‘De qualibet specie numeri partes sunt in continuo, et de qualibet specie numeri partes sunt extra continuum’ etc. Patet, quia licet sit bonum argumentum, non est tamen syllogismus, quia medium intrat conclusionem sub ratione medii, et **cum** hoc non est regulabile per dici de omni vel dici de nullo, quia reducendo hoc argumentum semper erit plus predicatum minoris quam distributum a parte subiecti in maiore.

[28] Quarta propositio: sicut ad debitam regulationem syllogismi requiritur quod qualis est habitudo medii ad maiorem extremitatem vel partem eius, talis debet esse habitudo minoris extremitatis ad maiorem in conclusione vel ad partem eius. Patet illa propositio. Si medium ponitur in obliquo respectu maioris extremitatis, minor

²² non] *s.l. M*

²³ hominis asinus] *tr. a.c. M*

extremitas etiam debet poni in obliquo respectu maioris in conclusione. Similiter, si medium coniungitur cum maiore extremitate vel parte eius mediante ly ‘vel’, ita etiam minor extremitas debet coniungi cum maiore²⁴ mediante ly ‘vel’ in conclusione. Exempla sunt facilia.

[29] Quinta propositio: licet ad debitam regulationem syllogismi kategorici in modo et figura requiratur quod medium in una premissarum distribuatur, non tamen debet argui a non distributo ad distributum. Prima pars patet. Secunda pars probatur, quia hoc argumentum nichil valet: ‘Omnis homo est animal, tantum homo est homo, igitur tantum homo est animal’, quia ly ‘animal’ distribuatur in conclusione et non distribuatur in maiore. Nec valet argumentum sic concludendo: ‘igitur tantum homo est omne animal’. Et causa quia in exponentibus non oportet syllogismum valere, ut etiam patet in hoc argumento: ‘Ab homine nullum differens est Sortes, et Sortes est ab homine differens, igitur Sortes non est Sortes’. Et supposito quod ly ‘homine’ in maiore supponat confuse tantum sine actu, tunc totum antecedens est verum et consequens falsum.

[30] Sexta propositio: sicut ex parte ampliationis [M 478] requiritur quod non arguitur ab amplo ad non amplum sine distributione nec econverso, ita ex parte appellationis et restrictionis requiritur quod non varientur. Patet, primo quia non sequitur: ‘Omne currens est asinus, et homo potest esse currens, igitur homo est asinus’. Tenet consequentia in Darii, nec ab amplo ad non amplum affirmative. Et cum distributione oportet valere: patet, quia non sequitur: ‘Omne album fuit Sortes, et nigrum fuit Sortes, igitur nigrum fuit album’. Assumptum pro secunda parte probatur, quia non sequitur: ‘Omnis homo est animal, et²⁵ homo est homo, igitur quidam homo est homo’, quia variatur restrictio. Similiter, non sequitur: ‘Quicquid papam qui fuit percussit, papam²⁶ qui fuit percussit, sed Buridanus papam qui fuit percussit, igitur Buridanus percussit papam’, quia variatur appellatio forme.

[31] Septima propositio: sicut ad debitam regulationem syllogismi requiritur quod medium eque ample accipitur in minore sicut in maiore et econverso, ita etiam requiritur quod medium non supponat pro pluribus in una premissarum quam in alia.

²⁴ maiore] ex *add. sed del. M*

²⁵ et] est *add. sed del. M*

²⁶ papam] percussit *add. sed del. M*

Probat, quia propter primum non valet hoc argumentum in Frisesomorum: ‘Album fuit Sortes, et nullum nigrum fuit album,²⁷ igitur Sortes non fuit niger’, supposito quod nichil fuerit nigrum. Propter secundum non valet hoc argumentum in Datisi: ‘Omnis homo vivit, et homo est mortuus, igitur mortuum vivit’, et si aliquo modo fieret, non oporteret argumentum valere, quia hic <non> valet: ‘Omne currens potest esse asinus, et omnis homo est currens, igitur omnis homo est asinus’, et tamen medium in maiore supponit pro pluribus quam in minore. Similiter, non valet hoc argumentum: ‘Omne currens est asinus, et omnis homo potest esse currens, igitur omnis homo est asinus’. Nec sic valet, vel ad minus non oportet valere: ‘Omne currens est asinus, et omnis homo potest esse currens quod est, igitur omnis homo est asinus’. Licet enim hoc argumentum sit bonum, non tamen est syllogismus, quia in simili non sequitur: ‘Omnis aqua est *A*, et omne *B* potest esse²⁸ aqua que est, igitur omne *B* est *A*’. Et volo quod *A* significet communiter Danubium, et suppono quod sit idem Danubius quis fuit ante 100 annos vel qui erit post 100 annos, et quod *B* significet communiter Wiennam aquam. Tunc totum antecedens est possibile et consequens impossibile. Similiter, hic non est syllogismus: ‘Nullum creans est Deus, omnis prima causa potest esse creans, igitur nulla prima causa est Deus’, quia in simili non sequitur: ‘Nullus Danubius est Vienna, et omnis aqua potest esse Danubius qui est, igitur nulla aqua est Vienna’. Item, non sequitur: ‘Nullum album est nigrum, et omne nigrum ymaginatur esse album quod est, igitur nullum²⁹ nigrum est nigrum’. Ex istis argumentis manifeste patet quod non oportet argumentum valere ab amplo ad non amplum³⁰ etiam cum distributione ampli.

[32] Octava propositio: sicut ad debitam regulationem syllogismi requiritur quod termini qui in ea distribuntur distribuantur distributione completa, ita ad bonam sylligisationem requiritur quod termini qui particularizantur particularizentur particulizatione completa. Prima pars istius propositionis patet ex expressione illius principii dici de omni. Et probatur ratione, quia si non complete distribuetur subiectum in Darii, sed solum distributione in termino,³¹ tunc staret quod tale subiectum affirmaretur de aliquo de quo non affirmaretur tale predicatum. Exemplum hic: ‘Omnis

²⁷ fuit album] *s.l. M*

²⁸ esse] a q *add. sed del. M*

²⁹ nullum] *s.l. M*

³⁰ amplum] *mg. M*

³¹ termino] *si add. sed del. M*

essentia divina est Pater, et Filius est essentia divina, igitur Filius est Pater'. Nec sufficit distributio extra terminum, quia non sequitur: 'Omnis humanitas est persona, Sortes et Plato sunt humani, igitur Sortes et Plato sunt persona'. Consequens falsum, cum sint due persone. Et maior est vera, quia valet tantum: 'Omnis una res que est humanitas est persona', saltem virtualiter et secundum ymaginationis Platonis. Sed secundum distributionem completam maior esset falsa et argumentum esset bonum.

[33] Sed pro secunda parte probatur de particulizatione, nam hoc argumentum alias nichil valeret: 'Pater generat,³² et omnis Pater est essentia divina, igitur essentia divina generat', et tamen non videtur quis sit defectus. Capiendo etiam ly 'omnis' in completa distributione, [M 479] totum antecedens est verum et consequens falsum, et tamen particularizando subiectum predicati complete conclusio erit vera, quia valebit tantum: 'Ens vel entia quod vel que <est vel> sunt essentia divina est vel sunt generans', et hoc est verum. Et sic illa: 'Essentia divina generat' non male sonat exprimendo distributionem completam. Et iterum illa est falsa: 'Nulla essentia divina generat', in completa distributione, patet advertenti, et illa³³ est eius contradictoria, igitur oportet quod sit vera, licet falsa esset si subiectum particularizaretur particularizatione in termino, et sic etiam male sonat etc.

<Articulus secundus>

[34] Quantum ad secundum articulum, notandum quid sit consequentia materialis et formalis. Patet. Secundo notandum quod quatuor requiruntur ad ydentitatem forme, scilicet eadem acceptio, eadem qualitas, idem situs terminorum, et ydentitas specifica sinkategorematum.

[35] Et per eandem acceptionem ego intelligo quod si aliquis terminus stat confuse <et> distributive, vel determinate etc., tunc in alia que debet secum esse eiusdem forme idem terminus vel³⁴ alius debet stare confuse <et> distributive, etc. Similiter, si unus accipitur ample, idem vel alter in alia debet accipi ample. Similiter, si unus restringitur,

³² generat] et *add. sed del. M*

³³ illa] essentia divina *add. sed del. M*

³⁴ vel] alter in alia *add. sed del. M*

tunc in alia idem vel alius debet restringi. Et si unus appellat suam rationem, tunc etiam etc.

[36] Ex istis possent inferri multa correlaria que causa brevitatis supersedeo.

[37] Secundo requiritur eadem qualitas, scilicet quod si una est affirmativa, alia debet esse affirmativa.

[38] Correlarium: ille non sunt eiusdem forme: ‘Homo est animal’, ‘homo non est animal’.

[39] Tertio requiritur idem situs terminorum, et per eundem situm terminorum intelligo quod totiens quotiens unus terminus ponitur in una, totiens idem vel alter debet poni in altera et consimili ordine.

[40] Correlarium: ille non sunt eiusdem forme: ‘Homo currit, igitur homo movetur’, ‘Homo currit, igitur homo est homo’. Patet, quia non totiens unus etc.

[41] Correlarium secundum: ille non sunt eiusdem forme: ‘Homo est animal, igitur homo est anima’, et ‘Substantia est currens, igitur currens est substantia’, quia ibi non servatur similis ordo.

[42] Correlarium: ille non sunt eiusdem forme: ‘Ille homo stat, et ille homo est Iohannes, igitur Iohannes stat’, et ‘Ille homo stat, et ille homo est Petrus, igitur Petrus stat’, in prima semper demonstrando idem per pronomen et in secunda diversa. Patet advertenti.

[43] Quarto requiritur ydentitas specifica sinkategorematum. Et pro isto suppono quod pronomina diversa demonstrantia differant specie. Tunc probatur quod requiratur ydentitas specifica, primo in non demonstrativis: nam ille due non sunt eiusdem forme: ‘Omnis homo est animal, et omne risibile est homo, igitur omne risibile est animal’, et ‘Omnis homo est animal, et omne risibile est homo, igitur omne risibile est animal’, capiendo in prima ly ‘omnis’ prout facit completam distributionem et in secunda prout facit distributionem in terminis. Patet, quia ibi non est ydentitas specifica sinkategorematum.

[44] Et si adversarius diceret quod ydentitas specifica sinkategorematum non requiritus, tunc argumentum primum non esset formale iuxta completam distributionem, quia in terminis divinis daretur instantia secundum distributionem incompletam. Et

iterum sequitur quod nullus descensus³⁵ consequentia formalis. Patet, quia si aliquis, maxime ille: ‘Omnis homo currit, et isti sunt omnes homines, igitur iste homo currit et iste homo currit et sic de aliis’, quia in simili non sequitur: ‘Omnis homo currit, et isti sunt omnes asini, igitur iste homo currit et iste homo currit et sic de aliis’. Et quod iste sunt eiusdem forme patet, quia nichil deficit, per adversarium – nisi forte diceret adversarius quod deficeret situs terminorum, quia³⁶ non totiens quotiens unus terminus ponitur in una totiens³⁷ idem vel alter ponitur in alia, etiam in quocumque numero. Modo in primo argumento ille terminus ‘homo’ ponit quater, ter in singulari et semel in plurali, sed hoc nihil valet, quia hoc est argumentum eiusdem forme cum primo: ‘Omnis homo currit, et isti sunt omnes homines, igitur iste homo currit et iste homo currit et iste homo currit et sic de aliis’. Et volo quod solum sint tres homines, et per ly ‘isti’³⁸ volo demonstrare [M 480] duos. Tunc in casu in quo tertius moreretur, totum antecedens esset verum et consequens falsum pro tertia singulari. Nec valet ascendere assumendo antiquum medium et constantiam simul. Eodem modo declaratur quod non est consequentia formalis.

[45] Istis premissis, sit prima propositio: licet ad alicuius syllogismi expositorii formalitatem sufficiant tres conditiones communiter a loycis posite, non tamen sufficiunt ad cuiuslibet syllogismi formalitatem. Prima pars patet ad istius syllogismi expositorii formalitatem: ‘Iste homo currit, et iste homo est Iohannes, igitur Iohannes currit’, quia in simili numquam datur instantia. Patet, quia maxime in terminis divinis: ‘Ista essentia divina est Pater, et ista essentia divina est Filius, igitur Filius est Pater’. Modo ibi non est ydentitas specifica sinkategorematum.

[46] Sed pro secunda parte probatur, quia hic non est syllogismus expositorius: ‘Sortes currit, et Sortes est homo, igitur homo currit’. Patet, quia in simili non sequitur: ‘A est Pater, et A est Filius, igitur Filius est Pater’. Et volo quod A singulariter significet Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum. Et tamen ibi sunt communes tres conditiones.

[47] Correlarium: si argumentum expositorium universaliter debet valere, tunc ad terminum singularem debet addi ‘omne quod est’, capiendo ‘omne’ in completa

³⁵ descensus] esset *add. sed del. M*

³⁶ quia] t *add. sed del. M*

³⁷ totiens] ydem *add. sed del. M*

³⁸ isti] iste *a.c. M*

distributione, ut ‘Omne quod est Sortes currit, homo est quod est Sortes, igitur homo currit’.

[48] Secunda propositio: licet alique due propositiones singulares que communiter dicuntur esse contradictorie formaliter repugnent in veritate et falsitate simul, non tamen omnes propositiones singulares que communiter dicuntur contradictorie repugnant formaliter in veritate et falsitate simul..

[49] Prima pars patet de illis duabus: ‘Iste homo currit, et iste homo est animal, igitur animal currit’, quia numquam datur instantia. Sed pro secunda parte probatur, quia ille communiter dicuntur contradictorie: ‘Sortes est homo’, ‘Sortes non est homo’, quia ille sunt eiusdem forme: ‘*A* est Pater’, ‘*A* non est Pater’. Et volo quod <*A*> singulariter significet hominem universalem, et volo quod unum suppositum sit Pater et non Filius, et aliud Filius et non Pater. Tunc ambe sunt simul vere, et tamen sunt eiusdem forme cum predictis.

[50] Correlarium: si singulares universaliter debent repugnare in veritate et falsitate, tunc debet addi ‘omne quod est’ et debet ly ‘omne’ capi in complete³⁹ distributione.

[51] Tertia propositio: licet propositiones insolubiles sint kategorice, nichilominus omne argumentum sylogisticum est formale. Prima pars illius propositionis patet, nam illa: ‘Sortes dicit falsum’ est insolubilis, ut suppono, et tamen est kategorica. Quod patet, quia habet subiectum et predicatum etc. igitur. Et iterum, ante casum insolubilem hec: ‘Sortes dicit falsum’, fuit kategorica, et ipsa significat eodem modo post casum sicut ante casum, igitur adhuc est kategorica. Quod ipsa significat eodem modo post sicut ante patet, quia nulla impositio est facta circa eam, igitur.

[52] Confirmatur: si significet aliquid vel aliquialiter propter casum insolubilem, maxime se esse falsam; sed hoc non, patet, quia ante casum non significavit sic, et non est impositio sensibilis facta, igitur nec post casum. Et iterum, si significet se esse falsam, vel hoc esset ex impositione vel naturaliter. Non primum, cum non sit impositio facta. Nec naturaliter, quia tunc semper significet sic, quia quicquid terminus naturaliter significat semper significat.

[53] Et declaratur hoc ex alio, nam volo quod Sortes concipiat illam in mente sua: ‘Sortes concipi falsum’. Et cum hoc habeat mentalem illius: ‘Homo est asinus’. Tunc

³⁹ complete] d *add. sed del. M*

utique in tali casu hec est vera: ‘Sortes concipit falsum’, quia sicut ipsa significat ita est. Modo volo quod Deus auferat illam mentalem: ‘Homo est asinus’, alia manente. Tunc ipsa est insolubilis, et non significat aliter quam prius, ut declaratum est. Ergo non potest dici quod propositio insolubilis significet se esse falsam.

[54] Ex isto infertur quod propositio insolubilis eodem modo significat ante casum sicut post casum.

[55] Pro secunda parte probatur propositio, nam hoc argumentum est formale: ‘Omnis homo est animal, risibile est homo, igitur risibile est animal’. Nec hoc argumentum: ‘Omne consequens est falsum, et *B* est consequens, igitur *B* est falsum’, est eiusdem forme cum predicta in casu insolubili, et causa est ista: quia ibi non est eadem acceptio. Patet, quia iste terminus ‘animal’ semper in antecedente et consequente accipitur pro quolibet animali, sed iste terminus ‘falsum’ in antecedente secundi argumenti accipitur pro consequente, et ly ‘falsum’ in consequente non accipitur pro consequente, quia terminus cuius suppositio dependet ex veritate vel falsitate propositionis non accipitur pro eo cuius est pars, nec supponit pro eo, quia alias sequitur quod propositio insolubilis significet se esse falsam, quod est contra prius dicta. Et sic illa insolubilis: ‘*B* est falsum’, tantum valet: ‘*B* est falsum non hoc’ virtualiter — sed non formaliter.

[56] Quarta propositio: omnes modi prime figure tenent gratia forme. Probatur, quia omnes modi prime figure sic se habent quod⁴⁰ numquam datur instantia in simili forma.

[57] Correlarium: questio est vera.

Anno Domini 1429

Mg. inf. rect.: in [in] quolibet disputato a magistro Urbano

Mg. inf. sin.: 1433^o

⁴⁰ quod] *p.c. M*